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From the early 1990s onwards, India has engaged in policies involving trade liberalisation, strong
controls on debt flows, and encouragement for portfolio flows and FDI, under a pegged exchange
rate regime. Domestic institutional factors have led to relatively little FDI and substantial portfolio
flows. There has been significant tension between capital flows and the currency regime. Many
tactical  details  of  the  intricate  reforms  to  the  capital  controls  derive  from  the  interlocking
relationships between monetary policy, the currency regime and capital flows. In the recent period,
pegging has given a capital outflow through reserves accumulation which was larger than the
substantial net private capital inflows. In March 2004, difficulties of pegging appear to have led to
a near-tripling of the nominal rupee-dollar returns volatility, which has reduced outward capital
flows. The goal of the early 1990s - of finding a consistent way to augment investment using current
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21 Introduction
Indian economic policy witnessed a marked shift following a balance of payments crisis in
1991. Prior to this, India had an “LDC style” composition of capital ﬂows, where current
account deﬁcits were ﬁnanced using oﬃcial ﬂows and debt ﬂows. As in other countries that
were liberalising capital ﬂows in this period, the conceptual framework underlying the reforms
of the 1990s was based on experiences with volatile debt ﬂows, views about the sustainability
of debt ﬂows, and views about a desirable composition of ﬂows.
The new approach, which has been broadly stable from 1992 till 2004, consisted of liberalising
the current account, opening up to FDI for domestic and foreign ﬁrms, opening up to portfolio
ﬂows for foreigners, and restricting debt ﬂows. The currency regime was shifted away from a
ﬁxed-but-adjustable exchange rate to a “market determined exchange rate” which was pegged
to the USD through extensive trading on the currency market by the central bank.
Indian capital controls consist of an intricate web of a very large number of quantitative
restrictions, operated by a substantial bureaucratic apparatus. Liberalisation of FDI and
portfolio ﬂows was done in a gradual manner, with a large number of incremental and partial
changes to the large number of rules. While some major decisions were taken in 1992, there
has been a continual process, which continues even in 2004, of changing restrictions in small
steps.
Liberalisation of the current account has been highly successful. Positive technological shocks
and dropping prices of international telecommunications helped India obtain high growth rates
of services exports. The removal of quantitative restrictions, and the sharp drop in tariﬀs,
served to spur both imports and exports. Through these, gross ﬂows on the current account
rose from 25 per cent of GDP in 1992-93 to 35 per cent in 2003-04.
Major changes took place on the capital account also. The policy bias against debt ﬂows
led to an outcome where net debt inﬂows stagnated at roughly 1 per cent of GDP between
1992-93 and 2003-04. Owing to the debt-aversion of the policy framework, gross debt ﬂows
actually dropped from 13.5% of GDP in 1992-93 to 10.6% in 2003-04. Oﬃcial ﬂows faded
into insigniﬁcance.
Restrictions on both equity portfolio investors and on FDI were eased in this period. However,
net FDI ﬂows into India have remained small, either when compared with Indian GDP or when
compared to global FDI ﬂows. In contrast with the Chinese experience, relatively little FDI
has come into India in setting up factories which are parts of global production chains. This
may be associated with inﬁrmities of Indian indirect taxes and transportation infrastructure.
India is more important as a platform for services production as a part of global production
chains, where diﬃculties of indirect taxes and transportation infrastructure are less important.
However, services production is less capital intensive, and induces smaller net FDI ﬂows.
Given the size of the Indian economy, and the relative lack of correlation with the global
business cycle, Indian equities have had low correlations with global risk factors. In addition,
India has fared well in creating the institutional mechanisms of a modern, liquid equity market.
Through these factors, portfolio ﬂows have predominated. India’s share in global portfolio
ﬂows is higher than India’s share in global FDI ﬂows, and net portfolio ﬂows are substantial
when compared to Indian GDP.
3In many countries, there has been a close interplay between foreign investment and growth
in trade. India has increased it’s share in world trade without having substantial FDI. One
part of an explanation lies in the low capital intensity of export-oriented production. Another
aspect is the initial conditions, which consisted of a strong set of domestic ﬁrms. Portfolio
ﬂows have delivered capital to these domestic ﬁrms, which have gone on to obtain growth in
exports. The growth of domestic ﬁrms has been assisted by relaxations of capital controls
which enabled them to engage in outbound FDI, which has served to diminish the size of net
FDI ﬂows.
While portfolio ﬂows are sometimes considered volatile, in India’s experience, there has been
no episode of a signiﬁcant retreat by foreign investors. Net FDI and net portfolio ﬂows have
been fairly stable. Debt ﬂows have been highly volatile, reﬂecting numerous changes in capital
controls applicable on debt ﬂows, and changing currency expectations.
Through these policy initiatives, gross ﬂows on the capital account grew from 15% of GDP
in 1992-93 to 20% of GDP in 2003-04, along with sharp changes in the composition of ﬂows.
In 2003-04, gross portfolio ﬂows amounted to as much as 7% of GDP.
The growth of the capital account, and the shift towards less government control of the ﬂows,
generated increasing diﬃculties in terms of reconciling currency policy and monetary policy
autonomy with the eﬀectively open capital account. Speculative views of the currency were
increasingly expressed by economic agents in many ways. Barriers to debt ﬂows blocked
currency speculation through debt. There were incentives for currency views to be expressed
through other channels of openness available. For example, in this paper, we ﬁnd that currency
expectations were important in explaining the predominantly equity-oriented portfolio ﬂows.
This generated diﬃculties in implementing the currency regime which had not been expe-
rienced prior to liberalisation of the capital account. Resolving these tensions became the
deﬁning issue for macro policy. From late 2001 to early 2004, the implementation of the
currency regime led to a sharp rise in reserves from $40 billion to $115 billion. This consti-
tuted a substantial outward ﬂow of capital. In 2003-04, net capital inﬂows of $21 billion were
accompanied by addition to reserves of $31 billion.
In retrospect, India’s approach of gradual liberalisation of the capital account has worked
well in many ways. India has reaped microeconomic beneﬁts of an open current account,
and from FDI and portfolio ﬂows. India has encountered no BOP crisis in the post-1992
period. At the same time, the size of FDI ﬂows has been disappointingly small. Trade and
technological sophistication might have grown faster if a more enabling environment had given
larger FDI. From the macroeconomic standpoint, there have been episodes where monetary
policy autonomy was signiﬁcantly attenuated in the implementation of the currency regime.
One key element of India’s original policy quest - the search for a sustainable framework for
augmenting investment through current account deﬁcits - has as yet not been achieved.
In this paper, we explore the causes and consequences of the major empirical features of India’s
experience with capital ﬂows. The paper begins with a review of India’s quest for a current
account deﬁcit (Section 2), and broad empirical features (Section 3). We review the historical
evolution of the currency regime (Section 4) and capital controls (Section 5). We examine
FDI and portfolio ﬂows in Section 6, where we also explore the interplay between currency
expectations and portfolio ﬂows. Section 7 turns to oﬃcial ﬂows. We closely examine 2003-
04, where a spurt in capital inﬂows was accompanied by $31 billion of outward ﬂows through
4reserves accumulation. Finally, in Section 8 and Section 9, we discuss some implications of
the present framework of capital ﬂows for contemporary macroeconomic policy issues.
2 The quest for a sustainable current account deﬁcit
India had low savings rates in the early period, with values of 9.8% in the 1950s, 12.5% in the
1960s and 17.2% in the 1970s. Economic policy thinking was very aware of the opportunity to
use current account deﬁcits, and net capital inﬂows, in order to supplement domestic savings,
augment investment, and thus enjoy a faster growth trajectory.
However, India persistently encountered diﬃculties in obtaining a sustained and substantial
current account deﬁcit. In the late 1970s, a combination of high domestic inﬂation, a world
oil price hike, and a pegged exchange rate generated low exports, a wider current account
deﬁcit, and near-exhaustion of reserves. In response to this, India undertook an IMF program
in 1981. Conditionalities associated with this program included revision of the exchange rate
(Joshi & Little 1994).
By the late 1980s, India had built up a signiﬁcant stock of external debt. In a period of
political instability in 1990, there was a crisis of conﬁdence, which gave a ﬂight of debt and
conditions of a speculative attack on the pegged exchange rate. In response to this, India
undertook an IMF program in 1991. Conditionalities associated with this program included
revision of the exchange rate, and a shift to a “market determined exchange rate”.
In recent years, several prominent documents in policy analysis have advocated larger but
sustainable current account deﬁcits:
• From Expert group on commercialisation of infrastructure projects, chaired by Rakesh
Mohan, 1996 (page 49):
The sustainability of such economic growth would require continuing high growth in
exports, perhaps declining from the current 20 per cent annual growth to about 10 per cent
by the end of the next decade, giving an average of about 15 per cent annual growth over
the period. If this takes place, total exports should reach about $66 billion in 2000-01 and
$115 billion by 2005-06. At these levels, exports would comprise about 15 per cent of GDP
in 2000-01 and 17 per cent of GDP by 2005-06, up from the current levels of about 10 per
cent. If exports manage to increase to these levels, it would become feasible for India to
sustain a wider current account deﬁcit which is required for the non-inﬂationary absorption
of external capital inﬂows. It is suggested that a sustainable level of current account deﬁcit
would increase from the current level of 1.5 per cent of GDP to 2.5 per cent in 2000-01 and
3 per cent in 2005-06. It would then be possible for the net capital inﬂow to rise from the
current level of about $7 billion to $8 billion to about $17 billion to $20 billion by 2000-01
and about $25 billion to $30 billion by 2005-06.
As Table 1 shows, India did better than anticipated. Total exports reached $118 billion,
or 18.4 per cent of GDP in 2003-04, and net capital inﬂows reached $20.5 billion.
However, far from obtaining a larger current account deﬁcit, as had been envisaged
in this prominent and inﬂuential report, India ended up with a current account surplus
of 1.7 per cent of GDP in 2003-04.
• The 10th plan document, which is a medium-term economic policy analysis eﬀort, ex-
presses regrets at the inadequate levels of the current account deﬁcit in recent years
5Table 1 Indian capital ﬂows: 1992-93 versus 2003-04
1992-93 2003-04 Growth 1992-93 2003-04
Billion USD Percent Percent to GDP
GDP at market prices 239.09 639.90 9.36
Current account (net) -3.53 10.56 -1.47 1.65
Merchandise outﬂows 24.32 80.18 11.46 10.17 12.53
inﬂows 18.87 64.72 11.86 7.89 10.11
Invisibles outﬂows 7.41 26.97 12.46 3.10 4.21
inﬂows 9.33 52.98 17.10 3.90 8.28
Capital account (net) 3.88 20.54 16.37 1.62 3.21
Oﬃcial ﬂows outﬂows 2.66 6.46 8.40 1.11 1.01
inﬂows 4.92 3.34 -3.47 2.06 0.52
FDI outﬂows 0.03 1.47 42.42 0.01 0.23
inﬂows 0.34 4.89 27.25 0.14 0.76
Portfolio equity outﬂows 0.00 16.86 127.46 0.00 2.64
inﬂows 0.24 28.22 54.01 0.10 4.41
Debt outﬂows 14.99 31.01 6.83 6.27 4.85
inﬂows 17.37 37.14 7.15 7.26 5.80
Miscellaneous outﬂows 2.34 2.27 -0.27 0.98 0.35
inﬂows 1.36 5.35 13.26 0.57 0.84
Reserves at year-end 6.43 107.45 29.17 2.69 16.79
Addition to reserves 0.70 31.42 41.35 0.29 4.91
Metric of integration 96.60 352.05 12.47 40.40 55.02
Trade integration 59.93 224.85 12.77 25.07 35.14
Financial integration 36.67 127.20 11.97 15.34 19.88
“Oﬃcial ﬂows” comprise external assistance, rupee debt service with respect to Russia, and IMF-related
monetary movements. “Debt” comprises commercial borrowings, short term loans and banking capital.
“Miscellaneous” is the sum of “Other capital ﬂows” and errors & omissions.
The Indian ﬁscal year runs from April to March, so 2003-04 runs from 1 April 2003 to 31 March 2004.
(Volume 1, paragraph 4.18):
The current account deﬁcit narrowed down and on the average was 0.8 per cent of GDP,
less than one half of the 2.1 per cent envisaged in the plan.
There has been considerable discussion about a development strategy where countries might
desire current account surpluses (Dooley et al. 2003). In India’s case, public statements on
development policy were in favour of current account deﬁcits. Many economists have argued
that the current account surplus in 2003-04, of 1.7 per cent of GDP, implies a signiﬁcant
opportunity cost in terms of investment foregone and thus lower GDP growth (Lal et al.
2003).
3 Broad empirical features
Broad facts about Indian capital ﬂows are presented in Table 1, which shows two years: 1992-
93 and 2003-04. The year 1992-93 was chosen since it reﬂects the last year of “the previous
regime” of highly restricted capital ﬂows.1 The year 2003-04 is the most-recent year observed.
1Signiﬁcant capital ﬂows through FDI and portfolio investment commenced in 1993-94, which justiﬁes the
choice of 1992-93 as the last year of the previous policy regime.
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GDP. Over this 11 year period, GDP measured in current dollars grew by an average of 9.4
per cent per annum.
Current account. India undertook major initiatives in trade liberalisation in this period
(Panagariya 2005). This led to growth rates of roughly 12 per cent per annum in imports and
exports of merchandise, and imports of invisibles. The dropping prices of global telecommu-
nications led to an increase in services exports from India, giving a higher invisibles export
growth rate of 17 per cent per annum. Putting these together, trade integration (measured
as gross current account ﬂows as percent to GDP) rose sharply from 25.1 per cent of GDP in
1992-93 to 35.1 per cent of GDP in 2003-04 : an increase of 10 percentage points in 11 years.
In addition, over this period, the current account switched from a deﬁcit of 1.5 per cent of
GDP to a surplus of 1.7 per cent of GDP.
Net capital ﬂows. On the surface, net capital ﬂows appear to have changed little, from 1.6
per cent of GDP in 1992-93 to 3.2 per cent of GDP in 2003-04 (see Figure 1). Yet, major
changes took place in the structure of capital ﬂows.
Debt ﬂows In 1992-93, which reﬂects the previous policy regime, the capital account was
dominated by oﬃcial ﬂows and debt ﬂows. Over this 11 year period, net oﬃcial ﬂows switched
from +0.9 per cent of GDP to -0.5 per cent, and net debt ﬂows stagnated at 1 per cent of
GDP. Given the limited accretion of debt, and high exports growth, the debt service ratio
dropped from 27.5 per cent in 1992-93 to 18.1 per cent in 2003-04.
FDI and portfolio investment. Major growth was seen in FDI and portfolio investment.
Gross ﬂows in these two channels grew sharply from 0.3 per cent of GDP to 8 per cent of GDP.
The average annual growth rate of net FDI ﬂows was 24.2 per cent and that for net portfolio
ﬂows was 41.9 per cent. Through these high growth rates, over this period, India switched
from “LDC style” capital ﬂows, emphasising oﬃcial ﬂows and debt, to an “emerging market
The year-end exchange rate used for 1992-93 incorporates the sharp devaluation which took place when the
rupee became a ‘market determined exchange rate’ in 1992. Hence, 1992-93 is also the ﬁrst year for which it
is meaningful to convert between rupees and dollars, e.g. for the purposes of re-expressing GDP in USD. All
values are shown in USD so as to ease interpretation and international comparison, and to avoid noise induced
by domestic inﬂation volatility in this period.
7Table 2 Cross-currency volatility (daily returns, 8/1992 - 11/2004)
USD GBP EUR JPY
INR 0.277 0.634 0.778 0.848
USD 0.588 0.738 0.836
GBP 0.601 0.896
EUR 0.932
style” structure of capital ﬂows, emphasising FDI and portfolio investment. Gross ﬂows on
the capital account reached 19.9 per cent of GDP in 2003-04, an increase of 4.5 percentage
points as compared with 1992-93.
Portfolio ﬂows are more prominent when measuring gross ﬂows on the capital account, since
they involve larger two-way ﬂows of capital. In 2003-04, FDI inﬂows were 3.33 times bigger
than FDI outﬂows, but portfolio inﬂows were only 1.67 times bigger than portfolio outﬂows.
Hence, even though net ﬂows through portfolio investment were 3.3 times larger than net FDI
ﬂows in 2003-04, gross portfolio ﬂows in 2003-04 amounted to 7 per cent of GDP, while gross
FDI ﬂows amounted to only 1 per cent of GDP.
Outward ﬂows. These changes were accompanied by a substantial outward ﬂow of capital
through purchases of foreign exchange reserves. The year-end reserves rose sharply from 2.7
per cent of GDP in 1992-93 to 16.8 per cent of GDP in 2003-04. In 2003-04 alone, the addition
to reserves was 4.9 per cent of GDP. In this year, net capital ﬂows of $20.5 billion, and a
current account surplus of $10.6 billion, were associated with an addition to reserves of $31.4
billion.
Global integration. The sum of gross ﬂows on the current and capital account serves as
an overall metric of integration into the world economy. This rose by 14.6 percentage points
over this 11-year period, from 40.4 per cent in 1992-93 to 55 per cent in 2003-04.
This data and description suggests that the two major features of India’s experience with
capital ﬂows have been:
• Rapid growth of foreign investment – particularly portfolio investment – accompanied
by slow growth of debt ﬂows.
• A substantial extent of outward ﬂows through reserves accumulation.
This paper seeks to shed some light on the causes and consequences of these major features.
4 Currency regime
In India, there has been a rich interplay between policies and outcomes on capital ﬂows
and the currency regime. According to the RBI, the Indian rupee is a “market determined
exchange rate”, in the sense that there is a currency market and the exchange rate is not ad-
ministratively determined. India has clearly moved away from ﬁxed exchange rates. However,
RBI actively trades on the market, with the goal of “containing volatility”, and inﬂuencing
the market price.






































In India, as in most developing countries, there has been a distinction between the de facto
and the de jure currency regime. Patnaik (2003) argues that there is a de facto pegged
exchange rate, for the following reasons:
• There is extremely low volatility of the INR/USD exchange rate alongside high volatil-
ities of other exchange rates such as the INR/Euro and INR/Yen. Table 2 shows that
the volatility of daily returns on the INR/USD has been 0.277, while (say) the volatility
of the INR/JPY has been 0.848. The latter value is remarkably close to the USD/JPY
volatility of 0.836. In the polar case where the INR/USD were a ﬁxed exchange, the
INR/JPY volatility would be exactly equal to the USD/JPY volatility. Volatilities of
the rupee against the GBP, EUR and JPY take on large values, similar to those of
ﬂoating exchange rates such as the USD/EUR or the EUR/GBP.
• Tests based on Frankel & Wei (1994) show that the USD is overwhelmingly the dominant
currency in explaining ﬂuctuations of the Indian currency (Table 3).2 The coeﬃcient
of the USD/CHF returns is 0.9345, which is near 1, while other coeﬃcients are near 0.
The R2 of this regression is 87.45%. These facts are consistent with a pegged exchange
rate regime.
2Frankel & Wei (1994) developed a regression based approach for testing for pegging. In this approach, an


















This regression picks up the extent to which the INR/CHF rate ﬂuctuates in response to ﬂuctuations in the
USD/CHF rate. If there is pegging to the USD, then ﬂuctuations in the JPY and DEM will be irrelevant,
and we will observe β3 = β4 = 0 while β2 = 1. If there is no pegging, then all the three coeﬃcients will be
diﬀerent from 0. The R
2 of this regression is also of interest; values near 1 would suggest reduced exchange
rate ﬂexibility.
















• India’s enormous reserves buildup after mid-2002 cannot be explained by a quest for
reserves as insurance.
• Extending the Calvo & Reinhart (2002) λ metric of currency ﬂexibility beyond 1999
shows that there has been no change in this metric over 1979-2003.
The extent of pegging has varied through this period. There have been multi-month periods
where the INR/USD exchange rate was ﬁxed, but there have also been periods where the
volatility of the INR/USD was closer to that of the INR/EUR or the INR/JPY. The facts
shown above represent the average behaviour over the period from 8/1992 to 11/2004.
As is typical with pegged exchange rates, signiﬁcant movements of the real eﬀective exchange
rate have taken place (Figure 2).
5 Capital controls
5.1 Evolution of capital controls
“Foreign institutional investors” (FIIs) were given permissions to participate on the Indian
market on 14 September 1992. Limits were placed where no one FII could own more than
5% of a company, and all FIIs (put together) could not own more than 24% of a company.
From 1992 onwards, restrictions on portfolio have been steadily eased while preserving sharp
constraints on bond investments. Table 4 shows the major events of the 1992-2004 period in
the easing of capital controls on portfolio ﬂows. It also gives a ﬂavour of the detailed system
of quantitative restrictions operated by the RBI, and the intricate steps through which reform
has come about. Through this reforms process, portfolio investors are now able to trade in
10Table 4 Chronology of easing controls on portfolio ﬂows
14 September 1992 “Foreign institutional investors” (FIIs) permitted into the country: these included pen-
sion funds, mutual funds, enowments etc. proposing to invest in India as a “broad based
funds” with atleast 50 investors and no investor with more than 5%. Permitted access
to primary and secondary market for securities, and products sold by mutual funds,
with a minimum 70% investment in equities. Ceiling upon one FII of 5% ownership of
any ﬁrm, and ceiling upon total of all FIIs at 24 %.
November 1996 New concept of “100% debt FIIs” permitted, which could invest in corporate bonds
but not goverment bonds.
4 April 1997 Ceiling upon total ownership by all FIIs of local ﬁrms raised from 24% to 30% (required
shareholder resolution).
April 1998 FIIs permitted to invest in government bonds, subject to a ceiling upon all FIIs put
together of $1 billion.
11 June 1998 Ceiling upon ownership by one FII in one ﬁrm raised from 5% to 10%. FIIs permitted to
partially hedge currency exposure using the currency forward market. FIIs permitted
to trade on the equity derivatives market in a limited way.
August 1999 Requirement that FII must have atleast 50 investors eased to 20 investors.
February 2000 Foreign ﬁrms and individuals permitted access to the Indian market through FIIs
as “sub accounts”. Local fund managers also permitted to do fund management for
foreign ﬁrms and individuals through sub accounts. Requirement that no investor can
have over 5% of the FII fund eased to 10%.
1 March 2000 Ceiling upon total ownership by all FIIs of local ﬁrms raised from 30% to 40% (required
shareholder resolution).
8 March 2001 Ceiling upon total ownership by all FIIs of local ﬁrms raised from 40% to 49% (required
shareholder resolution).
20 September 2001 Ceiling upon total ownership by all FIIs of local ﬁrms raised from 49% to “the sectoral
cap for the industry” (required shareholder resolution).
8 January 2003 Limitations upon FIIs hedging using the currency forward market removed.
December 2003 Twin approvals for FIIs at both SEBI and RBI replaced by single approval at SEBI.
November 2004 New ceiling placed upon total ownership by all FIIs of corporate bonds of $0.5 billion.
11the spot and derivative markets for both equities and currency. However, the changes in rules
have not always been only in the direction of liberalisation.
While considerable openness on FDI exists, there are restrictions on foreign ownership in
certain industries. For example, the foreign company engaging in FDI in insurance is limited
to a 26% ownership. Another major constraint inﬂuencing FDI is “Press Note 18”, whereby
a foreign ﬁrm which wishes to start a second project in India is required to take approval of
its ﬁrst domestic partner.
In recent years, some databases have sought to reduce the system of capital controls prevalent
in a country, at a point in time, into a simple score (Johnston & Tamirisa 1998). It is
instructive to examine their values for India. The IMF single-dummy indices have India as 1
from 1983 to 1995, a period over which major changes took place. Miniane (2004) reports a
composite measure based on 14 disaggregated indices, and ﬁnds that India moved from 0.917
in 1983 to 0.923 in 2000 (an increase in capital controls). The level and the change in both
these indices appears inconsistent with India’s experience.
5.2 Restrictions on CIP arbitrage
One element of the capital controls consists of barriers to arbitrage on the currency forward
market. In an ordinary forward market, arbitrage and only arbitrage deﬁnes the forward rate.
Even if there are strong speculative views and positions on the market, there is relatively little
that can be inferred from forward premium, since this is largely determined by covered interest
parity (CIP).3 When violations of market eﬃciency arise, near-inﬁnite capital should come
into play in arbitrage. Through this process, arbitrageurs restore market eﬃciency, and push
the forward price back to fair value.
In India, banking regulations place sharp restrictions upon the ability of banks to engage
in CIP arbitrage. Importers and exporters are permitted access to the forward market,
where they are free to either hedge or to not hedge. The supply and demand for forward
dollars by these “permitted hedgers” determines the forward price, and banks are prevented
from engaging in CIP arbitrage. This serves to break the link between the spot and the
derivative.4 In addition, the empirical experience with RBI’s trading shows that while RBI
3The arithmetic of forward pricing in an eﬃcient market is based on ‘covered interest parity’. Covered
interest parity involves comparing two routes for riskless USD investment. An investor could convert $1 into
(1 + ru)
T through ru, which is obtained from the US zero coupon yield curve for T years. Alternatively, the
investor could convert into INR at the spot price S, invest in the GOI zero coupon yield curve and obtain a
locked-in cashﬂow of S(1+ri)
T/F by converting back into USD at the rate F at date T. Under no-arbitrage,
these two investment strategies have to yield an identical return, through which the fair value for F can be
computed.
4Currency derivatives can either trade OTC or on exchange. In India, trading of currency derivatives on
exchange is infeasible owing to legal diﬃculties. Hence, our treatment is limited to currency forwards and does
not utilise data from a currency futures market.
Oﬀshore cash-settled forwards, named “Non-deliverable forwards” (NDF) markets” exist on the Indian rupee.
However, the mere existence of a currency forward market outside the reach of domestic currency controls is
not enough to generate informative prices in the sense of a forward market that is immune to CIP. The essential
and unique feature of India’s forward market is the restrictions upon CIP arbitrage. If (for example) a forward
market existed outside the country, but if arbitrage were feasible, then it would also obey CIP and the prices
observed there would be non-informative.
























trades extensively on the spot market, the observed forward price tends to be a market
determined rate.
As shown in Figure 3, in the INR/USD forward market, deviations from the covered par-
ity condition have tended to persist over multi-month periods. In an unrestricted market,
arbitrage would have wiped out such deviations almost instantly.
This situation – where restrictions on CIP arbitrage are coupled with a largely undistorted
forward market – have generated a remarkable information source as a side eﬀect. If economic
agents expect the rupee to depreciate, there would be a greater interest in selling rupees
forward – exporters would stay unhedged, and importers would be likely to hedge. Conversely,
if economic agents expect the rupee to appreciate, there would be greater interest in buying
rupees forward while those expecting to import would stay unhedged. Lacking adequate
arbitrage capital, the forward price does not get restored to the fair value. The deviation
between the fair value of the forward premium, and the observed value on the market, then
serves as a measure of the speculative views in the market about the future course of the
currency.5
If arbitrage was unrestricted, the forward premium would not have such an interpretation, and
would be relatively non-informative. Under the existing policy framework, the CIP deviation
is a uniquely useful high frequency market-based measure of future expectations; one that is
not available in most countries where regulators do not inhibit arbitrage.6
Given the nature of rules governing importers and exporters, there is little doubt that CIP
5Apart from conveying expectations of the market, the deviation between the observed forward premium
and its fair value also shows the arbitrage opportunity available to the few economic agents who are permitted
to engage in the trading required for doing CIP arbitrage. Their mass has - thus far - not been large enough
to remove CIP violations.
6Internationally, empirical research related to currency expectations uses data based on surveys (Frankel &
Okongwu 1996). Market participants, central bankers, multinational companies and economics departments
of banks are interviewed on a weekly or monthly frequency. Survey data such as the Currency Forecasters’
Digest, now known as the Financial Times Currency Forecast, forms the basis for a number of papers in the
ﬁeld (Chinn & Frankel 1994).
13Figure 4 Kernel density plot of CIP deviation













Table 5 CIP deviation as predictor of future currency returns (weekly data)
OLS OLS Robust LS Robust LS
CIP Deviation Lag 1 −0.025 0.009 −0.023 −0.010
(−2.83) (0.36) (−5.21) (−0.78)
Lag 2 −0.028 −0.014
(−0.84) (−0.82)




deviations in India reﬂect the views of economic agents who are given the choice between
hedging and not hedging. However, the extent of correctness of these views is a distinct
question. An important question concerns the extent to which the speculative views of the
market predict future exchange rate movements.
Two speciﬁc episodes can be isolated, where the views of the market proved to be wrong.
In 1993 and 1994, with strong portfolio inﬂows, the CIP deviation was strong and positive,
suggesting that private agents expected a currency appreciation. However, the RBI chose to
eﬀectively have a ﬁxed exchange rate of Rs.31.37, and the expectations of agents proved to
be wrong. In late 1997 and early 1998, in the aftermath of the East Asian Crisis, there were
strong expectations that the rupee would devalue sharply, giving very large negative values
of the CIP deviation (see Figure 3). In the event, domestic interest rates were raised sharply,
and the rupee did not devalue, so the expectations of agents proved to be wrong (Patnaik
2005).
We can test the extent to which lagged CIP deviations explain current changes of the exchange
rate. If market expectations are (on average) correct, when past values of the CIP deviation
are positive, this should be associated with currency appreciation (negative slopes).
14Table 6 CIP deviation as predictor of future currency returns (monthly data)
OLS OLS Robust LS Robust LS
CIP Deviation Lag 1 −0.121 −0.130 −0.097 −0.111
(−2.42) (−1.77) (−3.43) (−2.67)
Lag 2 0.171 0.080
(1.91) (1.58)




A diﬃculty faced in this regression is the distribution of the CIP deviation (Figure 4), where
there are some extreme values (from late 1997 and early 1998). These extreme values for
the CIP deviation prove to be inﬂuential observations in a regression. Hence, in addition
to showing OLS results, we investigate this question using a robust regression using an M-
estimator (Venables & Ripley 2002).
The results for weekly data (Table 5) and monthly data (Table 6) suggest that the CIP
deviation at a given point in time is a statistically signiﬁcant predictor of future currency
returns over a considerable future time period.7
5.3 Capital controls prevalent as of late 2004
The present state of capital controls may be summarised as follows:8
Current account There are no current account restrictions, other than the limit upon in-
dividuals of purchasing no more than $10,000 per year for the purpose of foreign travel.
Restrictions upon the currency market Market access to the currency market is severely
restricted, primarily to banks. Only economic agents with a direct current account or
capital account exposure are permitted to trade in the market. Exchange traded cur-
rency derivatives are absent. Importers/exporters face binding restrictions on the size
of their currency forward positions.
Outward ﬂows by individuals Individuals are limited to taking $25,000 per year out of
the country.
Outward ﬂows by ﬁrms Firms are limited to taking capital out of the country which is
equal to their net worth.
Borrowing by ﬁrms External borrowing by ﬁrms must be of atleast 3 years maturity below
$20 million and of atleast 5 years maturity beyond. Borrowing upto $500 million by a
ﬁrm “for certain speciﬁed end-users” – e.g. expanding a factory, or importing capital
goods – is allowed without requiring permissions. There is a ceiling whereby approvals
7These regressions are based on a daily time-series from 1/1/1997 till 4/2/2005. The last observed value
for the week or the month is used in converting to weekly or monthly frequencies. The simplest model
(currency returns on lagged CIP deviation) juxtaposes the currency returns of this month with the CIP
deviation prevalent at the end of the last month.
8The discussant of the paper, Takatoshi Ito, remarked that these capital controls were reminiscent of Japan
in the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s.
15Table 7 Ownership restrictions on FDI
Sector Limit on foreign ownership (per cent)
FDI prohibited
Retail, Plantations, Real estate. 0
FDI with limits on foreign ownership





Oil and gas pipelines 51
Trading 51
Petroleum exploration 51 to 100
Petroleum distribution 74






All other areas 100
for borrowing by all ﬁrms (put together), in a year, should not exceed $9 billion per
year. This ceiling has never been reached.
Firms are “required to hedge their currency exposure”, but there is no mechanism for
verifying this, and substantial restrictions on their activities on the currency forward
market are in place.
Borrowing by banks The central bank controls the interest rate at which banks borrow
from foreigners through “nonresident deposits”.9
Generic restrictions upon portfolio ﬂows Only “foreign institutional investors” are per-
mitted to invest in the country.
Debt investment by foreign portfolio investors The aggregate investment in govern-
ment bonds by all foreign investors cannot exceed $1.75 billion. The aggregate bond
investments by any one fund cannot exceed 30%. The total corporate bond ownership
by all foreign investors cannot exceed $0.5 billion.
Equity investments by foreign portfolio investors The aggregate foreign holding in a
company is subject to a limit that can be set by the shareholders of the company. This
limit is, in turn, subject to “sectoral limits” which apply in certain sectors. No one
foreign portfolio investor can own more than 10% of a company. Foreign ownership in
certain sectors (telecom, insurance, banking) is capped at various levels. Firms are free
to issue GDRs/ADRs outside the country, which can be sold to a broad swathe of global
investors. Within these restrictions, foreign investors are fully able to convert currency,
hedge currency risk, and trade in the equity spot or derivatives markets.
FDI Foreign ownership in certain sectors (e.g. telecom, insurance, banking) is capped at
9Gordon & Gupta (2004) analyses the determinants of nonresident deposits.
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Table 8 Sectoral composition of FDI: 8/1991 to 11/2004
Sector FDI ﬂows Percent to total
(Billion USD)
Oil and electricity 2.5 9.8
Telecom 2.7 10.5
Transportation 2.9 11.4
Electrical, electronics, software 3.8 15.1
Metals 0.5 1.9
Chemicals 1.7 6.0




various levels (Table 7). Foreign companies require approval of the ﬁrst ﬁrm they chose
to do a joint venture with in the country, if they wish to start a related business.
6 Investment ﬂows
6.1 FDI
Figure 5 shows the time-series of quarterly ﬂows of FDI. In order to aid comparability, it has
the same scale as Figures 1 and 6.
In many countries, high exports growth has been strongly associated with FDI. As shown in
Table 1, India has experienced annual USD growth rates of merchandise exports of 12 per
cent and services exports of 17 per cent. Thus, India’s share in world trade of both goods
and services has been increasing, without having high FDI. Two elements of an explanation
might be:
17Table 9 Country composition of Indian trade and FDI






FDI share computed 1991-2004, Trade shares over
1998-2004.
Labour intensive exports This may partly reﬂect the higher extent to which FDI into
India has emphasised labour-intensive economic activities, such as services exports. As
an example, call centres have a capital output ratio of just 0.75.10 Table 8 shows the
sectoral composition of FDI, which shows that like the Indian exports basket, FDI has
been diversiﬁed across a broad range of sectors. The services sector – which includes
export-oriented services and domestic services – accounted for only 8.2 per cent of total
FDI.
Strength of domestic ﬁrms Unlike many emerging markets or transition economies, India
had a strong set of domestic ﬁrms in place by the 1990s. A steady ﬂow of startups and
IPOs has fueled a large domestic corporate sector. These domestic ﬁrms were able to
engage in export-oriented activities, as opposed to the higher reliance seen in other
countries, upon foreign ﬁrms who would ﬁrst bring in FDI and then export. In India’s
case, the role of foreign capital ﬂows has worked, to a greater extent, through portfolio
ﬂows into the domestic equity market, to domestic ﬁrms, and thus to exports growth.
Domestic ﬁrms have been given an increasingly liberal framework for outward FDI ﬂows,
so that they can become multinational corporations. In 2003-04, gross FDI inﬂows of
$4.89 billion were accompanied by gross outﬂows of $1.47 billion. Oﬀshore investments
by Indian ﬁrms made up part of the latter. To this extent, Indian data shows lower net
FDI ﬂows.
Table 9 shows the country composition of FDI into India.11 In the case of each of the top ﬁve
countries by FDI share, the FDI share of the country considerably exceeds the trade share
of the country. China and UAE are examples of countries where India has substantial trade,
but are not sources of FDI to India.
10The rough ﬁnancial structure of a 1000-seat call centre, as of 2004, is as follows. The project cost is
roughly $15 million, of which $10 million is ﬁxed capital (excluding real estate). The annual revenue works
out to roughly $25 million, of which the value added is roughly $20 million.
11These fractions have been computed using the following adjustment. The largest country which sends FDI
to India, in the data, is the island of Mauritius (34.5%). India has an advantageous tax treaty with Mauritius,
and many investors choose to incorporate in Mauritius in order to beneﬁt from this tax treatment. The values
above show the fraction of countries in the non-Mauritius FDI into India, and are only accurate insofar as the
country composition of FDI into India that is routed through Mauritius is the same as the country composition
of FDI that comes directly to India.
18Table 10 Correlation matrix of some stock market indexes
This uses weekly returns data from 10/1995 to 2/2004. Nifty is the Indian stock market index of the top 50
stocks. Nifty Jr. is the second rung of 50 stocks. Cospi is the encompassing Indian index of all active stocks,
which number around 2000. Kospi is the Korean stock market index.
Full period
Nifty Jr. Kospi Nifty S&P 500
Cospi 0.862 0.254 0.911 0.159
Nifty Jr. 0.233 0.776 0.099
Kospi 0.280 0.312
Nifty 0.221
First half (10/1995 – 12/1999)
Nifty Jr. Kospi Nifty S&P 500
Cospi 0.868 0.105 0.935 0.101
Nifty Jr. 0.101 0.803 0.023
Kospi 0.155 0.237
Nifty 0.169
Second half (12/1999 – 2/2004)
Nifty Jr. Kospi Nifty S&P 500
Cospi 0.863 0.424 0.892 0.209




6.2.1 Indian securities in a global portfolio
In the portfolio optimisation of a globally diversiﬁed investor, in a rational setting, the appeal
of Indian securities is related to their lack of correlation with global risk factors. Some
correlations of weekly returns, in the period from 10/1995 to 2/2004, are in Table 10.12
In many small countries, liberalisation eﬀorts in terms of a more open current account, FDI
and portfolio ﬂows has led to increased correlations, which has served to diminish the beneﬁts
from diversiﬁcation. In order to explore this issue, Table 10 also breaks the overall period
into two halves. The correlation of the overall index (Cospi) against the S&P 500 doubled
from 0.1 in the ﬁrst half to 0.21 in the second half. However, 0.21 remains a small number by
world standards. For example, it is lower than the correlation of Korea’s Kospi against the
S&P 500 in the ﬁrst half. It is also signiﬁcantly lower than the Korean correlation of 0.396
in the second half.
These low correlations suggest that Indian equities could play a useful role in improving
the Sharpe’s ratio of globally diversiﬁed portfolios. As an illustrative example, applying a
portfolio optimiser to the historical covariance matrix over this period yields weights of 61.6%
for the S&P 500, 11.5% for the Korean KOSPI and the remainder in India (19.1% in Nifty
and 7.8% in Cospi).
12October 1995 is used as the starting point for this dataset, since it reﬂects the point by which the early
sharp increase in foreign portfolio ﬂows had been completed, and some major changes in the domestic equity
market design had been completed. Hence, the period from 10/1995 onwards represents a comparable period.
196.2.2 Factors inﬂuencing home bias
In a rational world, decisions about including securities from a given country into global port-
folios should be based on the improvements in diversiﬁcation obtained therein. At the same
time, a strong problem that is well known in the literature is that of the “home bias”, where
individual and institutional portfolios tend to hold higher weights of local country securities.
In the literature, home bias is believed to be related to informational asymmetries and trans-
actions costs. For example, Portes & Rey (2001) ﬁnd that the geography of information –
rather than the quest for eﬃcient portfolios through diversiﬁcation – dominates patterns of
cross-border equity ﬂows. Other practical constraints include size and liquidity in securities
markets of small countries.
India’s success on attracting substantial portfolio ﬂows relate to strengths on these issues of
information, size and liquidity.
Size: India is a large economy, with a strong set of domestic ﬁrms in place by the 1990s when
portfolio ﬂows commenced. A steady ﬂow of startups and IPOs has fueled a large domestic
corporate sector. As of February 2005, the market capitalisation of the equity market was
$400 billion.
Information: On the issues of informational asymmetries and transactions costs, India had
strengths in terms of a century-old tradition of law, accounting, and stock market trading with
extensive participation by domestic households. This implied that many issues about law,
information disclosure and corporate governance, which were important to foreign investors,
were broadly in place in India before portfolio ﬂows commenced. India’s extensive use of
English, and the extensive presence of individuals of Indian origin in global ﬁnance companies,
has helped reduce the informational asymmetry faced by foreign investors. Familiarity with
India amongst global ﬁnance companies was further heightened from the late 1990s onwards,
when most major global ﬁnance companies started moving parts of their production process
to India, including areas such as call centres, accounting, back oﬃce processing, research, and
software development.
Liquidity: While the extensive participation by domestic households oﬀered the possibility
of a liquid and active stock market, in the early 1990s, there were many weaknesses in the
market design, which led to high transactions costs. As a response to these weaknesses, many
domestic ﬁrms chose to disintermediate the domestic securities markets, and engage in oﬀshore
issuance through American Depository Receipts (ADR) or Global Depository Receipts (GDR)
markets. This allowed these ﬁrms to exploit the superior market design which was available
outside in London or New York. However, securities issued outside the country did suﬀer
from poor liquidity owing to the lack of widespread trading interest and incompatible time
zone.
Partly as a response to the diﬃculties faced by foreign investors on domestic stock markets,
India embarked on a major program of modifying incentives and institutions on the securities
markets (Shah & Thomas 2000, 2003a). This involved a new securities regulator (SEBI),
and a new set of securities trading institutions (NSE, NSCC and NSDL). These institutions
innovated on the market design, introducing all the elements of world class securities infras-
tructure: demutualisation of the exchange (1993), electronic limit order book market (1994),
elimination of entry barriers into intermediation (1994), nationwide access (1994), novation at
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the clearing corporation (1996), dematerialised settlement (1996), equity derivatives trading
(2000-2001) and T+3 and then T+2 rolling settlement (2001, 2002).
This reforms program had a profound impact upon transactions costs (Shah & Thomas 1997).
It helped foster IPOs and the growth of market capitalisation, and foreign investment. It also
eliminated the rationale for oﬀshore issuance as a mechanism to disintermediate an ineﬃcient
domestic market.
In the process of institution building on the securities markets, India harnessed the scale
economies associated with a large number of listed companies and a large number of active
speculators. The two stock markets in India - NSE and BSE - are ranked 3rd and 5th in the
world by the number of transactions. These economies of scale in India were a sharp contrast
with the diﬃculties faced by many small countries in building liquid securities markets (Shah
& Thomas 2003b).
The bond market experienced a very diﬀerent trajectory in the domestic reforms process, and
largely failed to achieve comparable results in terms of liquidity and transparency. However,
the prevailing policy environment aimed to discourage debt related ﬂows. Hence, the weakness
of the bond market was not a binding constraint in shaping portfolio ﬂows.
6.2.3 Growth of net portfolio ﬂows
Figure 6 shows the time-series of quarterly portfolio ﬂows. In order to aid comparability, it
has the same scale as Figures 1 and 5. India’s share of world portfolio ﬂows considerably
exceeds India’s share in world FDI ﬂows.
6.2.4 FIIs and the domestic equity market
India is a retail-dominated equity market, where institutional investors account for roughly
10.8 per cent of spot market turnover, and just 3.3 per cent of derivatives turnover. Easing
capital controls for foreign portfolio investors has given extensive trading by foreign portfolio
21Table 11 Foreign institutional investors on the equity market
(Rs. billion)
For calendar year
2001 2002 2003 2004
End-year number of FIIs 490 502 540 637
End-year number of sub-accounts 1,372 1,361 1,542 1,785
Spot market activity:
Gross buy 518 288 944 1857
Gross sell 386 253 640 1467
Net 131 35 305 390
Derivatives activity:
Gross buy n.a. n.a. n.a. 842
Gross sell n.a. n.a. n.a. 861
Net n.a. n.a. n.a. -19
Table 12 Gross turnover
(Rs. billion)
For calendar year
2001 2002 2003 2004
Spot market:
NSE+BSE gross turnover 23416 19142 26340 34168
FIIs 904 540 1583 3323
Derivatives:
NSE+BSE gross turnover 838 6927 28804 52118
FIIs 1703
Equity spot + derivatives
NSE+BSE gross turnover 24254 26070 55145 86286
FIIs 904 540 1583 5027
investors. Thus, putting the spot and derivatives markets together, in 2004, FIIs purchased
Rs.2699 billion and sold Rs.2328 billion (Table 11). Over the recent four years, the number
of registered FIIs has risen from 490 to 637, and the number of sub-accounts has risen from
1,372 to 1,785, showing a greater diversity of the foreign investors present.
Derivatives transactions by FIIs were not separately tracked prior to 2004. The inclusion of
derivatives data from 2004 onwards overstates the increase in FII turnover for 2004, which
hence shows a sharp jump from Rs.1583 billion in 2003 to Rs.5027 billion in 2004. While
Rs.5027 billion of gross FII turnover - summing across spot and derivatives markets – appears
to be a large number, it now makes up only 5.83 per cent of the overall Indian equity market
(Table 12).13
13A key feature of measurement in Table is the use of “gross turnover”. Trading volume data, as normally
reported by exchanges, shows volume of Rs.100 when one security worth Rs.100 goes from a seller to a buyer.
However, when data is captured about the gross trading of market participants, this transaction shows up
twice, as Rs.200 of trades. To ensure comparability, the table re-expresses all data as gross turnover, by
doubling the trading volume as reported by exchanges.




CIP deviation 106.937 74.679
(5.26) (2.09)
Squared CIP deviation 8.985 4.121
(2.10) (0.76)
US 90-day rate -15.686
(-0.51)
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3
Lagged Nifty returns -0.350 6.960 8.550
(-0.06) (1.18) (1.47)
Lagged industrial growth -8.061 27.042 -4.12
(-0.24) (0.88) (-0.14)






6.3 Determinants of portfolio ﬂows
Given the prominence of portfolio ﬂows into India, it is important to understand the fac-
tors that shape portfolio ﬂows.14 In the literature on portfolio ﬂows into emerging markets,
evidence has been found about the importance of the US interest rate and ﬂows into equity-
oriented fund managers in the US. If foreign fund managers react to information in India with
a lag, then lagged output and lagged stock returns should help predict portfolio inﬂows. If
decisions of foreign fund managers are shaped by expectations about the currency, then the
CIP deviation should help predict portfolio inﬂows.15
Portfolio ﬂows into government bonds are highly restricted by India’s capital controls. Hence,
we focus on portfolio ﬂows into the equity market. Table 13 shows two OLS regressions which
explain portfolio ﬂows into the equity market. The timespan available is short, from March
1998 till October 2004. None of the explanatory variables are signiﬁcant in the “kitchen sink”
model, other than the CIP deviation. The parsimonious model is a quadratic in the CIP
deviation, where bigger ﬂows come into the equity market when the currency is expected to
appreciate, with a nonlinearity in response where bigger deviations induce bigger inﬂows.
These results suggest that in India’s short experience, traditional explanatory variables appear
to be relatively less important, and that currency expectations do play a role in shaping
portfolio ﬂows into the equity market.
14This question has been recently addressed by Gordon & Gupta (2003).
15As of late 2004, the Indian rf was 4.5%, the historical equity premium was roughly 8% and the annualised
volatility of the equity index was roughly 20%. The Sharpe’s ratio of the equity index – as viewed by a foreign
investor – would hence be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by currency views of (say) ±5%.
236.4 Evaluating India’s experience with the composition of capital ﬂows
India represents a striking example of a developing country where portfolio ﬂows have been
particularly important, with net portfolio ﬂows presently running at roughly three times
the size of net FDI ﬂows. India’s experience is hence important from the viewpoint of the
literature on composition of capital ﬂows.
Where many economists have argued in favour of FDI given that FDI is “bolted down” and
cannot ﬂee in the event of a crisis, recent research has brought new perspectives to bear on this
question. Hausmann & Fernandez-Arias (2000) ﬁnd that when countries develop, while total
capital ﬂows go up, the share of FDI in capital ﬂows goes down. They argue that portfolio
ﬂows require more sophisticated institutions and a greater degree of trust on the part of the
investor, and that a domination of FDI is found in countries with the weakest institutions.
In addition, Fernandez-Arias & Hausmann (2000) argue that FDI is not necessarily “bolted
down”, that a ﬁrm faced with a currency crisis can ﬁnd many instrumentalities to take capital
out, such as borrowing in the country against physical assets as collateral, and taking ﬁnancial
capital out of the country. In this context, Bird & Rajan (2002) oﬀer striking evidence from
Malaysia. In the period from 1990 to 1997, Malaysia had no portfolio inﬂows, and FDI
dominated their capital inﬂows. Yet, Malaysia went on to experience a currency crisis.
The Indian experience is interesting from the viewpoint of this debate. India represents an
important example of a country where sophisticated institutions have helped obtain high
success in attracting portfolio ﬂows.
7 Outward ﬂows owing to reserves accumulation
As argued in Section 3, a major feature of India’s recent experience with capital ﬂows has been
the outward ﬂows of capital taking place owing to purchase of reserves. The recent experience
with the stock of reserves and the ﬂow of net purchases by the RBI on the currency market
is shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8.
This shows a striking buildup of reserves, from roughly $40 billion to $115 billion, over the
period from late 2001 to early 2004. Through this period, RBI purchases on the currency
market went up to $7 billion in April 2004. Patnaik (2003) argues that this reserves buildup
was related to implementing the currency regime. Trading by RBI on the currency market,
and the change in reserves, understates the extent of outward capital ﬂows, since many other
decisions were also taken in order to help sustain the currency regime which were associated
with outward capital ﬂows and reduced inward ﬂows. These included prepayment of loans of
the government, through which the net capital ﬂows on account of “Oﬃcial ﬂows” in 2003-4
seen in Table 1 show an outward ﬂow of $3.12 billion.
Through this period, India experienced current account surpluses. This was a paradoxical
turnaround compared with the starting point of the reforms. A goal of the early reforms
was to ﬁnd a sustainable mechanism to sustain the import of capital, i.e. a current account
deﬁcit. By 2002, India found itself in a situation with persistent export of capital, which
raised concerns about the adverse impact on GDP growth (Lal et al. 2003).
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25Table 14 The rupee-dollar exchange rate, 9 March to 5 April 2004



















An equally interesting feature of India’s experience was the period from mid-March 2004
onwards, where currency trading by the RBI, and hence the reserves accumulation, slowed
down. Table 14 shows the small daily ﬂuctuations of the INR/USD rate going upto 19 March
2004, and the larger volatility from that date on. The ﬁrst nine days shown in this table had
a zero change in the exchange rate; the second nine days shown had a appreciation of 3.4 per
cent. In the period from 1/1/2000 till 19/3/2004, daily INR/USD returns had a volatility of
0.129 per cent. For some of the following months, (22/3/2004 till 11/2/2005), the volatility
had nearly tripled, to 0.355. This suggests that there may have been a change in the currency
regime for the period after 19 March 2004, leading to a drop in outward capital ﬂows through
purchase of reserves. Across these events, however, no change in the currency regime was
oﬃcially announced.
Even in months where little trading was done by RBI, reserves continued to ﬂuctuate owing
to the currency composition of the portfolio, and returns are earned on the ﬁxed income
instruments in which reserves are invested.16 In addition, the period after May 2004 was one
where the USD depreciated signiﬁcantly against the Euro. Since India held signiﬁcant Euro
denominated assets, but reported foreign currency reserves in USD, this showed up as higher
reserves.
16India does not disclose the currency composition of the reserves portfolio. On 30 April 2004, disclosures
under the IMF Template on International Reserves showed that of the reserves portfolio of $113 billion, $40
billion were held as securities, and $72.9 billion were held as “Currency and deposits”. Of the securities
portfolio, the US Treasury disclosure system (Sobol 1998) (http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt) showed
that in December 2004, India had $12.9 billion of US government bonds.
268 Implications of the present framework
8.1 Impossible trinity
As highlighted in Table 1 early in this paper, the size of the current account and the capital
account rose sharply from 1992-93 to 2003-04. Gross ﬂows on the current account, expressed
in USD, grew at a compound rate of 12.77 per cent per annum, and gross ﬂows on the capital
account grew at a similar rate of 11.97 per cent per annum. Both these growth rates were
faster than the growth of GDP expressed in nominal USD of 9.36 per cent per annum. Hence,
the overall measure of integration rose sharply from 40.4 per cent of GDP in 1992-93 to 55
per cent in 2003-04.
Under these conditions, considerable movements of capital can take place in response to
speculative views about the currency. As an example, the regression results of Table 13, CIP
violations are an important explanatory variable in the model for portfolio ﬂows.
The year 2003-04 serves as a valuable illustration of how capital ﬂows would behave under
conditions where the currency regime left signiﬁcant opportunities for speculative trading on
the currency. Going beyond the current account, FDI and portfolio ﬂows, even under the
constraints in place in India, debt ﬂows can also play a role in currency speculation. It is
striking to notice that in 2003-04, debt ﬂows worked out to roughly $6 billion out of total net
capital ﬂows of $20 billion.
Finally, it is well known in the literature on capital controls that the current account can be
used for implementing capital movements and currency speculation, through overinvoicing,
underinvoicing, prepayment, and delayed payments (Patnaik & Vasudevan 2000). These
issues have become more pertinent, given the sharp rise in the size of the current account,
from 25% of GDP in 1992-93 to 35% in 2003-04.
These arguments suggest that the impossible trinity is an increasingly important constraint
faced by Indian macro policy (Joshi 2003). Patnaik (2005) examines how monetary policy
was attenuated through implementation of the currency regime in two prominent episodes in
the recent 11-year period.
As outlined in Section 7, the pressures in implementing the pegged exchange rate were height-
ened in 2003 and 2004, and while no public announcement has been made about a change in
the currency regime, nominal rupee-dollar volatility rose signiﬁcantly from 0.129% per day in
some months to 0.355% per day in other months.
India continues to grapple with the tradeoﬀs associated with the impossible trinity. On 12
January 2005, the head of the central bank proposed that India should re-examine the exist-
ing framework of capital controls, and possibly introduce a fresh set of restrictions including
quotas or ceilings on portfolio ﬂows, enhancing “quality of ﬂows” by restrictions upon eli-
gible foreign investors, price-based measures such as taxes, and monitoring and restrictions
upon voting rights of non-residents. While no decisions were taken to introduce such capital
controls, the speech highlights the tensions faced in Indian macro policy, and the diﬃculties
faced in the existing combination of a pegged exchange rate and a fairly open capital account.
27Table 15 Volatility of capital ﬂows : summary statistics of quarterly data in million USD,
from Q1/1995 to Q2/2004
Minimum 25th Median 75th Maximum Inter-quartile
percentile percentile range
Raw data
Portfolio −423 260 594 899 4111 624
FDI 365 595 886 1175 1768 564
Debt −1257 270 826 2330 3895 1825
Oﬃcial −2657 −738 −24 210 857 921
Total −1514 1436 2426 3969 5315 2496
Residuals about time trend
Portfolio −1278 −531 −19 311 2903 815
FDI −534 −137 −26 115 666 246
Debt −2448 −826 −230 1083 2833 1806
Oﬃcial −2249 −555 261 511 1214 1017
Total −3648 −771 224 1317 2340 2018
8.2 Volatility of capital ﬂows
As argued above, India’s stance on liberalisation of the capital account was strongly motivated
by certain priors about the volatility of capital ﬂows, and about the extent to which diﬀerent
kinds of capital ﬂows would impinge upon implementation of the prevailing currency regime.
In the literature, there has been disagreement about the volatility of the various kinds of
capital ﬂows, and the interplay between the currency regime adopted and the volatility of
certain kinds of capital ﬂows.17
We can use quarterly BOP data in order to review India’s experience with volatility of the
four components of capital ﬂows. In order to avoid the formative period, we focus on the
period after 1995. This helps us obtain information about the behaviour in the post-reform
period.
Table 15 shows summary statistics about the four components of net capital ﬂows, using data
for 37 quarters from the Q1/1995 to Q2/2004. Since the data often has unusual distribu-
tional characteristics, the interquartile range is used as a relatively nonparametric measure
of dispersion.18
The raw data show that a net outﬂow was never observed in the case of FDI. FDI and Portfolio
ﬂows have similar values for the inter-quartile range. Debt and oﬃcial ﬂows seem to be much
more volatile than FDI and portfolio ﬂows.
When expressed as residuals about a time trend, all four components have experienced sig-
niﬁcant negative outﬂows in the worst quarter. Viewed in this fashion, FDI ﬂows seem to be
17In Asia, in the decade of the 1990s, (Alfaro et al. 2004) ﬁnd that in Asia, the volatility of capital ﬂows has
been 1.2 for FDI, 15.4 for portfolio equity ﬂows, and 1.6 for debt. They deﬁne “volatility of capital ﬂows” as
the standard deviation of per capita net capital ﬂow divided by the average of gross inﬂow and gross outﬂow.
18The prob values obtained using the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality for the ﬁve time-series are : Portfolio
(4.672×10
−6), FDI (0.081), Debt (0.035), Oﬃcial (0.0018) and Total (0.57). Hence, we avoid the use of the
standard deviations as a measure of dispersion.
28Table 16 Saving, Investment, Current account deﬁcit
Year Savings Investment Current account balance
1995-96 25.1 26.9 -1.7
1996-97 23.2 24.5 -1.2
1997-98 23.1 24.6 -1.4
1998-99 21.5 22.6 -1.0
1999-00 24.2 25.3 -1.0
2000-01 23.7 24.4 -0.6
2001-02 23.4 22.6 0.7
2002-03 26.1 24.8 1.2
2003-04 28.1 26.3 1.7
highly stable, and more stable than other components. The ranking of volatility of compo-
nents, when viewed in this fashion, appears to be Debt > Oﬃcial > Portfolio > FDI.
Over this period, ﬂuctuations in debt and oﬃcial ﬂows frequently reﬂected changes in the
policy framework. Capital controls and other policy levers were regularly used to encourage
or discourage debt and oﬃcial ﬂows, depending on the tactical exigencies of implementing
the currency peg. On some occasions, oﬀshore borrowing was eﬀectively initiated by the
government, and banks were encouraged to borrow abroad high rates (set by RBI). At other
times, strict controls have been placed on oﬀshore borrowing, and the interest rate at which
banks borrow has been cut (Gordon & Gupta 2004). Hence, there is a need for caution in
interpreting the characteristics seen therein, which may reﬂect factors such as policy volatility
and currency expectations. The volatility of debt ﬂows and of oﬃcial ﬂows might have been
very diﬀerent if India’s policies on capital controls had been stable, or if the currency regime
had been diﬀerent.
The results for the volatility of India’s portfolio and FDI ﬂows appear to be more meaningful,
since they reﬂect the outcomes obtained under a broadly stable policy framework, subject to
a steady process of liberalisation whereby controls have been slowly relaxed over the years,
with an essentially one-way direction of reforms.
8.3 Failure to achieve a current account deﬁcit
As emphasised in Section 2, India has long sought to augment domestic savings using capital
ﬂows so as to achieve a higher investment rate. As argued above, the currency regime chosen
by India led to a failure to achieve this goal, despite a considerable success in attracting
sustained capital ﬂows.
Table 16 shows how from 1995-96 to 2003-04, India lost 3.4 per cent of GDP of an investment
rate owing to the change in the current account balance. In the table, the savings rate rose
strongly by 3.0 percentage points of GDP over an eight year period, but the investment rate
actually dropped by 0.6 percentage points of GDP.
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India serves as an interesting case study in integration into the world economy. The initial
conditions involved a small trade/GDP ratio, and a highly repressed capital account. At
the same time, India had many potential strengths for participating in the global ﬁnancial
markets. These included strong traditions of law and accounting, a long tradition of equity
ownership and trading, and an absence of a history of default.19
The goals of the reforms of the early 1990s were articulated by the policy makers of the time
as comprising three elements:
1. Avoiding debt ﬂows and particularly short term debt ﬂows, which were viewed as being
potentially destabilising.
2. Increasing India’s trade integration into the world.
3. Spurring Indian growth by harnessing the growing global FDI and portfolio ﬂows.
In the post-war period, two successful “Asian Development Models” are known. The ﬁrst
is the approach of a completely closed capital account, with no FDI and no portfolio ﬂows,
which was followed by Japan (1950s-1960s), and Korea and Taiwan (1970s-1980s). There is
the alternative approach of encouraging FDI and having restricted portfolio ﬂows, followed
by Singapore (1970s-1980s), Malaysia and Thailand (1980s-1990s) and China (1980s). Both
these models used substantial rigidity in the currency regime. India appears to have embarked
on a diﬀerent path, with considerable freedom for both FDI and portfolio ﬂows, modern
institutional development of securities markets, considerable success in attracting portfolio
ﬂows, and a movement towards greater currency ﬂexibility.
India did not engage in ‘big bang’ liberalisation. The full policy implications of this broad
position were worked out through a steady pace of numerous reforms initiatives in the 1992-
2004 period. The present framework of tariﬀs, restrictions against FDI and restrictions against
portfolio ﬂows implies that the reforms agenda on the current account, on FDI and on portfolio
ﬂows remains incomplete as of 2004.
Looking back, these goals have been achieved to a signiﬁcant extent:
1. Net debt ﬂows were at roughly 1% of GDP in both 1992-93 and 2003-04. Gross debt
ﬂows actually dropped sharply, from 13.5% of GDP in 1992-93 to 10.6% in 2003-04.
2. Trade integration has gone up sharply, with gross current account ﬂows rising from 25%
of GDP in 1992-93 to 35% in 2003-04.
3. FDI and portfolio ﬂows have gone up sharply. India has fared particularly well in
the institutional transformation of the equity market, which helped Indian equities
obtain acceptance in global portfolios. The experience with FDI ﬂows, while showing
strong growth rates when compared with the initial conditions, lags that of other Asian
countries, both in absolute terms and when expressed as per cent to GDP.
19As emphasised in Reinhart & Rogoﬀ (2004), some countries are “serial defaulters” and pose high risks to
foreign sources of capital. India has been through two IMF programs in situations where a ﬁxed exchange
rate regime was challenged owing to near-exhaution of reserves (in 1981 and 1991). However, India has never
defaulted.
30In an open-economy, these three aspects of policy are closely intertwined with the currency
regime. India has been in a quest for openness in trade, FDI and portfolio ﬂows, while contin-
uing to have capital controls in most other respects, and trying to have both an independent
monetary policy and a pegged exchange rate. There was a very strong consensus about the
usefulness of extensive trading by the central bank on the currency market in implementing
currency policy. Indeed, issues about the currency regime were not debated in the 1992-2002
period.
As a consequence, India’s experience with capital ﬂows is deeply intertwined with India’s
experience with the currency regime. Capital ﬂows have shaped the currency regime, and the
currency regime has shaped capital ﬂows.
Openness on the trade account, FDI and portfolio ﬂows has given economic agents oppor-
tunities to express speculative views about currency movements, and thus thrown up new
problems in the implementation of pegging. India diﬀers from China in the importance of
portfolio ﬂows. Portfolio ﬂows involve robust inﬂows and outﬂows. For example, in 2003-04,
portfolio inﬂows were only 1.67 times bigger than portfolio outﬂows, and gross portfolio ﬂows
amounted to 7 per cent of GDP.
Diﬃculties faced by the central bank in implementing the currency regime have continually
inﬂuenced the pace of removal of controls on capital ﬂows. In particular, there has been
signiﬁcant policy volatility with respect to debt ﬂows, ranging from periods with government-
sponsored oﬀshore borrowing to periods with sharp restrictions upon oﬀshore borrowing.
Similarly, policies on outward capital ﬂows have been ambivalent, and have lacked the con-
sistent direction of reform that was found on the current account, on FDI and on portfolio
ﬂows.
The implementation of the currency regime has led to large capital outﬂows in the form of
reserves accumulation by the RBI. This was particularly the case in 2003-04, when 4.9% of
GDP left the country in this fashion. The total outward ﬂow was larger than this when we
take into account other policy tools such as pre-payment of oﬃcial debt, which were used in
2003-04.
One of the key goals of the reforms of the 1990s was to augment domestic GDP growth by
attracting FDI and portfolio ﬂows. In 2003-04, the total net capital inﬂows of $20.5 billion were
accompanied by an outward oﬃcial capital ﬂow of over $31.4 billion. This leads to concerns
about whether this policy framework has succeded in serving the interests of accelerating
GDP growth. India has undoubtedly reaped microeconomic beneﬁts from the new presence
of FDI and foreign investors on the equity market. However, a sustainable macroeconomic
framework for a current account deﬁcit, and augmenting domestic investment using foreign
capital, is not yet in place.
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